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Abstract
In this paper, we study a model where voters have state-contingent preferences
over policies and lobbies engage in inuence activities to a¤ect the information that
a media outlet collects on the state of the world. The media outlet acts as a lter
between lobbies and voters. It has to decide what to communicate to voters given
the information it collects and its idiosyncratic bias. We show that, by targeting
voters, lobbies are able to indirectly inuence the political outcome and thus create a
distortion in the political process. When the media outlet has a small idiosyncratic bias
the (unique) equilibrium is characterized by a large level of lobbiesinuence activities
and no news-slantingby the media outlet. When the media outlets idiosyncratic
bias is large, the (unique) equilibrium involves a low level of lobbiesinuence activities
and a high probability of news-slantingby the media outlet. Moreover, we show that
a higher idiosyncratic bias of the media outlet may be associated with a lower policy
distortion and a higher voterswelfare. On the other hand, public policy measures
aimed at increasing the cost of lobbiesinuence activities would decrease the distortion
in the policy outcome and increase voterswelfare. Finally, asymmetries in lobbies
inuence activities lead to di¤erent probabilities of news-slantingby di¤erent media
outlets types.
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1 Introduction
One of the most potent and cunning lobbying tactics of the past decade,
grassroots campaigning, will also probably escape oversight. This secretive hy-
brid of telemarketing, data mining and spin doctoring is used to generate public
support for otherwise unpopular corporations caught in a legislative battle
- A tap on the wrist, The Economist, May 18th 2006
What are the e¤ects of lobbies inuence activities on the political outcome? The eco-
nomic literature has long being interested in this question. In a seminal paper, Becker (1985)
introduced the concept of inuence functionsuggesting that by exerting some kind of po-
litical pressure interest groups are able to a¤ect the tax or subsidy that they pay/receive.
In the twenty years that have followed, many scholars have analyzed this issue by focusing
on the relationships between lobbies and politicians. This extensive literature has shown
that special interest groups may directly inuence the policy outcome by targeting politi-
cians.1 Indeed, lobbies allocate large amount of resources in trying to inuence politicians.2
Nevertheless, such direct channel of policy inuence is not always e¤ective or feasible for
lobbies. First of all, in the case of direct democracy (i.e., referenda, ballots, propositions,
etc.), politicians are simply not the policy-makers. Moreover, there are issues where the
political cost that any politician would incur by endorsing a lobby and deviating from the
median voters preferred policy would be extremely high. Examples of such non-pliable
issues are abortion, death penalty, gun control and gay marriage.3 Therefore, whenever
lobbies cannot directly a¤ect the policy outcome by inuencing politicians, they have to try
to do so indirectly by targeting voters. In the US, 527 groupsconstitute a clear example
of special interest groups whose activities are explicitly focused on voters.4 Thus, the ques-
tion that remains to be addressed is whether and how lobbies can create a policy distortion
when they cannot directly inuence politicians. Moreover, given that media represent the
main communication channel between lobbies and voters, another question arises. How are
lobbies inuence activities and media bias related? Finally, what is the overall e¤ect of
lobbies and media on the e¢ ciency of the political outcome and on voterswelfare?
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework to investigate these questions by con-
sidering an environment where lobbies do not have any direct relationship with politicians
1See among the others Austen-Smith (1993), Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996, 2001),
Lohmann (1998), Coate (2003, 2004), Prat (2002a, 2002b), Felli and Merlo (2006).
2In the 2004 presidential elections, George W. Bush and John Kerry received around 274 and 227
million dollars, respectively, from individuals and Political Action Committees contributions. Source:
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/index_2004.asp
3Matsusaka (2007) nds that the congruence (i.e., the correlation) between policy and public opinion in
US states is 88% for gay marriage and higher than 70% for public funding of abortion and death penalty.
4A 527 group is "a tax-exempt group organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code to raise
money for political activities including voter mobilization e¤orts, issue advocacy and the like.[...] Many
527s run by special interest groups raise unlimited "soft money," which they use for voter mobilization and
certain types of issue advocacy, but not for e¤orts that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a federal
candidate or amount to electioneering communications" (http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.asp)
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and voters acquire information through media. We analyze a multistage game where two
parties compete on a single issue and voterspreferences are a combination of a private value
component (their idiosyncratic preferences) and a state-dependent public value component
(the expected benets and costs that alternative policies deliver in di¤erent states of the
world). In the rst stage of the game, two opposing lobbies compete to inuence the infor-
mation that a media outlet collects on the state of the world. The media outlet represents
a lter between lobbies and the public (i.e., voters and parties): it has to decide what
to communicate to people given the information it collects and its own idiosyncratic bias.
That is, the media outlets report is the result of three di¤erent components: the true state
of the world, lobbies inuence activities and the media outlets idiosyncratic bias. After
having observed the report of the media outlet, voters update their beliefs on the state of
the world. Then, in the nal stage, parties choose their platforms to maximize the number
of votes. Hence, lobbies try to indirectly a¤ect the policy outcome by inuencing voters
beliefs on the state of the world (i.e., on the costs and benets of alternative policies).
More specically lobbies try to inuence the information on the state of the world that
the media outlet collects by searching for favorable evidence. Since every policy involves
at the same time costs and benets (e.g., implementing an environmental treaty typically
involves economic costs and benets for the environment), opposing lobbies are able to nd
pieces of hard information going in opposite directions in every state of the world. However,
since in a given state of the world one policy is more e¢ cient than another (i.e., it has a
better benet/cost ratio than the other), there are relatively more possible pieces of hard
evidence in favor of that policy. Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is more likely that the overall
evidence will be in favor of the most e¢ cient policy. The evidence produced by such interest
group decreases the noise in the information that the media outlet collects (i.e., relatively
more evidence in support of the most e¢ cient policy). Viceversa, the other interest group
produces evidence that increases the noise in the information that the media outlet collects
(i.e., relatively less evidence in favor of the most e¢ cient policy). Therefore, theoretically,
two di¤erent cases can arise:
i) The rst one is the case where, overall, an equal increase in the inuence activities of
both lobbies increases the noise in the information that the media outlet collects (noise-
increasing lobbies).
ii) The second one is the case where, overall, an equal increase in the inuence activities of
both lobbies decreases the noise in the information that the media outlet collects (accuracy-
increasing lobbies).
We analyze the noise-increasing case in section 4. We show there that by providing a
micro-foundation for this indirect lobbying process, our model o¤ers new insights on the
e¤ects of lobbiesinuence activities and media bias on the political process. First, we point
out that by targeting voters special interest groups are indeed able to indirectly a¤ect the
policy outcome and thus create an ex-ante policy distortion. That is, even if the policy
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that o¢ ce-motivated candidates choose and implement is the one preferred by a majority
of voters, this policy is not the one that the median voter would have chosen if lobbies
were not to engage in inuence activities. Therefore, our analysis suggests that restricting
the attention only to the relationships between politicians and lobbies may lead to a limited
understanding of the actual impact of special interest groups on the policy outcome. Indeed,
while there seems to be a general consensus on the idea of limiting the extent to which special
interest groups can lobby politicians, there are yet no boundaries on how much lobbyists
can try to inuence voters.5 Second, there are two intrinsically related sources of slantin
the information that voters receive. Lobbiesinuence activities introduce a source driven
slant in the information that the media outlet collects (lobbies-induced slant). At the same
time there is a supply driven slant resulting from the idiosyncratic bias of the media
outlet (media-induced slant). When the media outlet has a small idiosyncratic bias, there
will be a unique equilibrium characterized by a large level of lobbies inuence activities
(high lobbies-induced slant) and no news-slantingby the media outlet (no media-induced
slant). When the media outlets idiosyncratic bias is large, the unique equilibrium involves
a low lobbies-induced slant and a high media-induced slant (in a probabilistic sense). As
a consequence, di¤erences in the level of lobbies activities and in the bias of the media
outlet lead to di¤erences in votersbeliefs and thus to di¤erent policy outcomes. Hence,
our analysis provides a possible economic rationale to explain di¤erences in the median
voter positions across countries in presence of the same idiosyncratic preferences of voters.
Moreover we show that by discouraging lobbies to engage in inuence activities, a higher
media outlets bias may lead to a lower policy distortion and a higher voterswelfare. We
also show that the more voters care about receiving accurate information, the more noisy
will be the information they actually receive.
We then provide a microfoundation of this noise-increasing case in section 5 where the
competition between lobbies is modeled as a race for evidencewhich generates a State Con-
tingent Contest-Success Function (SCCSF). That is, we derive the noise-increasing property
of lobbiese¤orts starting from the primitive assumption that lobbies have di¤erent instan-
taneous probabilities of being successful in inuencing the information that the media outlet
collects on the state of the world.6
For theoretical completeness, in section 6 we also analyze the accuracy-increasing case.
We show that even in this case lobbies have (almost always) higher incentives to engage in
inuence activities in presence of a media outlet with a small bias. Moreover, we show that
in this case the media-induced slant and the lobbies-induced accuracy are positively related
and thus multiple types of equilibria may arise for intermediate values of the media outlets
bias.
5In the US, for example, the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign nance law prohibited parties from ac-
cepting soft money but it left unregulated 527 groupsactivities.
6See also Sobbrio (2009) for a simple model of hard information showing how the presence of lobbies
hiding unfavorable information leads to such noise-increasing property.
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In section 7 we present and discuss various extensions of the benchmark model. We show
that the main results and intuitions of the model are robust to i) Known direction of media
outlets bias, ii) No uncertainty on the bias of the media outlet; iii) Multiple media outlets.
More specically, we show that asymmetries in media bias do not generate asymmetric
incentives for lobbies to engage in inuence activities. Moreover, we also point out that
a (not too much) biased media outlet may a¤ect the policy outcome even in presence of
rational, bayesian voters who know its bias. We also consider the case where the media
outlet is unbiased and we highlight how the case where lobbies communicate directly with
voters is indeed nested in our model.
On the other hand, we also show that asymmetries in lobbies inuence activities do
generate asymmetric incentives for di¤erent media outlets types to slant their reports. That
is, asymmetries between lobbies lead to di¤erent probabilities of news-slantingby di¤erent
media outlets types. More specically, when only the leftist (rightist) lobby is present, for
a given ex-ante bias, a rightist (leftist) media outlet will have higher incentives to slant
its reports than a leftist (rightist) one. This suggests that, in presence of asymmetries
between lobbies, a correct measure of the bias of a media outlet should take into account
the equilibrium di¤erence between the ex-post slant in a media outlets reports and the
ex-ante bias of the media outlet itself.
1.1 Empirical Evidence
There is a considerable amount of evidence showing that special interest groups do not limit
their activities to politicians but they also care about inuencing voters. In the US, lobbies
use three main types of instruments to inuence voters: advocacy groups, issue advertising
and think tanks.7
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in the 2004 election cycle advocacy groups
(527 groups) spent more than 600 million dollars in trying to inuence how voters look at
the issues they are interested in. In particular, ideological and single issue advocacy groups
spent between 400 and 500 million dollars.8
Issue advertisements are ads run by political action committees (PACs), advocacy
groups and other kinds of lobbies (e.g., private rms), about public policy issues (i.e., not
products or candidates). Falk et al. (2006) estimate that more than 400 million dollars were
spent on print and television issue advertisements just inside the Washington DC metropol-
itan area, between 2003 and 2004.9
Think tanks are non-prot research organizations which analyze public policy issues and
7In other countries (e.g., western Europe) the lobbying sectors are typically informal(i.e., not institu-
tionalized). Thus, while there is anecdotal evidence on lobbiesinuence over voters in many countries, it
is di¢ cult to know the exact amount of money spent in indirect lobbying outside the US.
8Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp?level=E&cycle=2004
9More specically, their estimates report that 79% of the total spending in issue ads was done by corpo-
rations. Notice that, issue advertisements are not regulated under federal campaign nance laws. Thus, it
is not possible to exactly quantify the amount of resources spent on this type of political expenditure.
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advocate solutions.10 The number and the importance of think tanks have been growing
over time. Rich (2004) estimates that in 1996 there were 306 think tanks operating in
the US.11 While some think tanks are non-partisan, some others engage in ideologically
oriented research. As depicted by a 2002 Note of the Harvard Law Review, think tanks
often provide a platform for particular viewpoints by packaging and popularizing policy
proposals.12 Out of the 306 think tanks listed by Rich (2004), 165 were identied as being
ideologically oriented (i.e., either conservative or liberal).13
While in the case of issue advertising the communication between lobbies and voters
is unltered, in other instances lobbies inuence activities are channeled through the
media.14 A clear example of such ltered communication is media reports over think
tanksresearch. While an unbiased media outlet would report the research of di¤erent think
tanks in a balanced way, a biased media outlet may slant its reports by selectively omitting
relevant information (i.e., emphasize the results of a think tanks research and hide the ones
of another). Indeed, there is an emerging empirical evidence showing the presence of this
kind of bias in the media. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) propose a measure of media bias by
comparing the number of times a media outlet cite a think tank with the number of times
members of the congress cite the same think thank. They nd that, with few exceptions,
most of US news media outlets are more leftist than the average member of the congress.15
At the same time, the recent empirical literature on media have shown that media bias
matters. That is, media do inuence voters behavior (Della Vigna and Kaplan 2006, Gerber
et al. 2006). Della Vigna and Kaplan (2006) study the e¤ect of the entry of Fox News
in the cable market and they nd that between 3 to 8 percent of its viewers were indeed
convinced to vote Republican. Gerber et al. (2006) conduct a natural eld experiment to
measure the e¤ect of exposure to the Washington Times and Washington Post in the month
before the 2005 Virginia Gubernatorial election. They nd that individuals assigned to the
Washington Post treatment group were eight percent more likely to vote for the democratic
candidate than those belonging to the control group.16 This emerging empirical literature is,
10Think tanks are tax exempt organizations (regulated under section 501(c)(3) of the IRS code). The
main advantage of such exemption is to allow think tanks to receive unlimited contributions from private
foundations. Moreover, contributions to think tanks are tax deductible. For a comprehensive description
and discussion of think tankslegal status and activities see The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The
Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure, Harvard Law Review, March 2002, 115(5): 1502-1524.
11Rich also shows that the 80% of the think tanks in existence in 1996 were formed after 1970 and their
number has been steadily growing over time. Other studies use di¤erent classication of think tanks and
report an even higher number of think tanks (e.g., Hellebust (1996) lists 1,212 think tanks operating in
1996).
12Source: The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure,
Harvard Law Review, 2002, page 15203.
13See Pepper (2005) for a discussion of ideologically-oriented research on gun control.
14The case of unlteredcommunication is formally analyzed in section 7.4.
15For additional evidence on the presence of bias in the media see Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007). See also
Anderson and McLaren (2007) for anecdotal evidence and a discussion on the political motivations of media
corporations and how media can bias their reports by selectively omitting information.
16For additional evidence on the e¤ect of media on policy-making see Besley et al. (2002), and Stromberg
(2004b).
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thus, highlighting the importance of considering and analyzing in our theoretical framework,
the presence of biased news media acting as a lterbetween lobbies and voters.
1.2 Related Literature
The economic literature seems to have largely overlooked the issue of grassroots activities
and special interestsinuence on voters.17 The papers that are most closely related to our
work are Baron (2005) and Yu (2005). Baron (2005) considers a model of hard information
where an activist lobby and an industry search for evidence on the true state of nature, and if
they nd such information they have to decide whether to conceal it or report it to the media.
Baron shows that the activist lobby has an incentive to conceal while the industry does not,
moreover the media will nd optimal to bias its report in favor of the policy preferred by the
activist lobby. This model, while analyzing a more complex structure of the media market,
restricts lobbiesstrategic decisions to be binary (conceal/not conceal) while we construct a
more general (and symmetric) framework where lobbiesinuence activities are a continuous
function of the incentives structure of the game and in particular of the idiosyncratic bias
of the media. Moreover, such framework allows us to derive a direct measure of the policy
distortion arising from interest groupsinuence activities and media bias and then analyze
the e¤ects of such distortion on voterswelfare.
In Yu (2005), lobbies compete by inuencing both politicians and voters. Yu shows that
such inuence activities are complementary. Moreover, an increase in the e¤ectiveness of
voterspersuasion or awareness induces a substitution e¤ect between the inuence activities
targeted to politicians and the one aimed towards voters. However, contrary to our work,
Yu assumes an exogenous relation between votersposterior beliefs and lobbiese¤orts and
does not analyze the role played by media.
Our paper is also related with Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) since both papers look at
the issue of production of information by agents and e¢ cient decision making. However,
the focus and thus the conclusions of the two papers are quite di¤erent. Dewatripont
and Tirole analyze the problem of an organization who has to take a decision based on
the information provided by agents engaging in moral hazard. They show that an advocacy
system where two agents compete to produce favorable evidence is, in general, more e¢ cient
of a system with a single non-partisan agent. In our model there is no such moral hazard
problem in information gathering since interest groups want to produce favorable evidence to
ensure a benecial political outcome. This creates strong incentives to conceal unfavorable
information. Therefore, in our setting, a single unbiased agent collecting information (e.g.,
academia) may indeed lead to a more e¢ cient policy outcome than the one arising in presence
of two lobbies advocating their respective positions.18
17The rst contribution looking at this issue is Grossman and Helpman (2001). In their model a lobby
wants to educate the public by sending a costless message. They show that the median voter is likely to be
harmed by such communication whenever her preferences are not close to the ones of the lobby.
18Indeed, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) notice that "we assumed all along that moral hazard in infor-
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Our paper also contributes to the literature on media bias. This literature has, so far,
identied two di¤erent forces creating a bias in media reports. The rst one is a supply-
drivenone: media bias is the result of the idiosyncratic preferences of journalists (Baron
2006), owners, editors (Djankov et al. 2003, Anderson and McLaren 2007), governments
(Besley and Prat 2006) or advertisers (Ellman and Germano 2008). The second one is a
demand-drivenbias. Part of this literature assumes that voters like to receive information
conrming their bias and thus media just reect and conrm the bias of their audience
(Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005, Bernhardt et al. 2008). On the other hand, Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006) show that even when voters do not like biased information, if media have
reputation concerns and there is uncertainty on the quality of the media, a bias towards
consumer prior beliefs will arise in equilibrium even in absence of any exogenous media
bias. Our model suggests that even when media do not have any biased preferences or any
incentive to produce biased reports, their reports may still be biased since the information
they collect may be biased itself. That is, there is a source-drivenbias in media reports
due to the distortion in information created by lobbiesinuence activities.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on cheap-talk where the Receiver is uncertain
about the Senders preferences.19 Our model considers an environment where the Receiver
(voters and parties) does not know whether the Sender (media outlet) is biased and at the
same time does not know the direction of the possible bias. Moreover, the probability distri-
bution of the signal that the Sender receives on the state of the world is also endogenously
dependent on the size and probability of its bias. We show that di¤erent types of informative
equilibria may arise depending on the size of the bias and on the probability of the Sender
being biased.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure and timing of the
game. Section 3 analyzes the interactions among the media outlet, voters, parties and
lobbies. Section 4 derives the di¤erent types of perfect bayesian equilibria in the noise-
increasing case and discusses the results of the model. Section 5 provides a microfoundation
of the noise-increasing property. Section 6 briey analyzes the accuracy-increasing case.
Section 7 discusses several extensions of the benchmark model. Section 8 concludes. All the
proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The political process involves a single issue or policy P . Without loss of generality we
assume the policy space to be 	 = [0; 1]: The political system is characterized by two o¢ ce-
mation acquisition made it necessary to provide powerful incentive schemes for agents leading to advocacy
[...]. These incentive schemes induce concealment as well as acquisition. If information collection is easy,
it makes sense to reduce the power of incentive schemes so as to [...] induce truthful release of existing
information." (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999, page 20).
19See among the others Morris (2001) and Morgan and Stocken (2003).
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motivated parties L and R that choose their platforms, PL and PR respectively, in order
to maximize their votes. There are two possible states of the world s 2 fA;Bg. The prior
probability of the state of the world s = A is assumed to be common knowledge and it is
denoted by :
There is a continuum of voters of measure one with quadratic utility function:
Ui(P; di) =  (P   di)2 (1)
Voter i policy preference di is a combination of a private value component and a state-
dependent public value component, i.e., di(xi; v) = xi + v; where
v =
(
  if s = A
 if s = B
(2)
The private value component xi represents the idiosyncratic policy preference of voter i.
The state-dependent public value component v captures the fact that, regardless of their
idiosyncratic policy preferences, voters value the costs and benets that di¤erent policies
deliver in di¤erent states of the world. In other words, by convention, if the state of the
world is A then the public benets of a policy P = 0 are assumed to be higher than the
public costs and as P increases the benets decrease and the costs increase (viceversa if
s = B). That is, if the state of the world is A individuals prefer, ceteris paribus, a policy
closer to the left end of the political space. Instead if the state of the world is B individuals
prefer a policy closer to the right end of the political space:20 The parameter  measures the
importance of the state-dependent public value component in individualsutility functions.
The private value component of voter is preferences, xi; can be seen as the policy that voter
i would choose if she were to believe that both states of the world are equally likely.21 Such
idiosyncratic preferences are distributed with a common knowledge c.d.f. F (x) with density
function f(x). Without loss of generality we restrict the support of f(x) to be [; 1   ];
so that the ex-ante support of voterspolicy preferences is the policy space 	.22 We denote
the median of f(x); that is the idiosyncratic preference of the median voter, as xm:
An example may help to clarify the meaning of this voters utility specication. Suppose
the issue on which voters have to decide is to what extent the Kyotos protocol should
20This specication of the votersutility function is similar to the one of bidders in an a¢ liated value
auction. In the same way the valuation of the object is correlated across bidders in an a¢ liated value
auction, the valuation of the policy is correlated across voters in our setting.
21Notice that having a more general specication of votersutility functions would not change our results
in any signicant way. For example as an alternative specication we could have the following: di(xi; v) =
(xi)
v
; with v =

 if s = A
1= if s = B
and the support of f(x) being [0; 1] and   1: That is the policy
preferences of more centrist voters would have a higher correlation with the true state of the world with
respect to the ones of more extremists ones. Notice also that the presence of stubborn voters (i.e.,
voters whose preferences are not state-contingent), would not change our results.
22Note that for  ! 0; we are in a pure private value setting. Viceversa, if  ! 12 we are in a pure public
value environment. We are going to focus our attention on the general case where  2 (0; 12 ):
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be implemented. Let the states of the world be A =strong e¤ects of pollution on global
warming and B =mild e¤ects of pollution on global warming. Each voter has some
idiosyncratic preferences about the importance of protecting the environment. Nevertheless,
in order to choose her optimal policy, each of them also take into account the information she
receives on the likelihood of the state of the world. For example, if voters receive (credible)
reports saying that pollution does not have a strong impact on global warming (s = B), each
of them would revises downward her idea of the benets deriving from the Kyotos protocol.
Instead, if voters receive the opposite report they would revise upward their beliefs on the
importance of implementing the Kyotos protocol. Figure 1 below, illustrates an example
of the distributions of voterspolicy preferences in the two polar cases where there is no
uncertainty regarding the state of the world (i.e., Pr(s = A) = 1 and Pr(s = B) = 1).23
f(di|Pr(s=B)=1)
xm+γ
(No ratification of
Kyoto’s protocol)
1
(No regulation
of industry)
xm-γ
(Full implementation
of Kyoto’s protocol)
0
(No pollution
allowed)
f(di| Pr(s=A)=1)
Figure 1. Distribution of voters preferences with no uncertainty.
There is one media outlet whose quadratic utility function is:
Un(P; dn) =  (P   dn)2 (3)
where dn contains a private value component and a state-dependent public value component,
i.e., dn('n; v) = 'n+ v; where v is dened as in (2). The idiosyncratic preference parameter
'n 2  = f'l; '0; 'rg and it is private information of the media outlet. The possible media
outlet idiosyncratic preferences are assumed to satisfy the following:
Assumption 1. 'l < '0 = xm < 'r
xm   'l = 'r   xm
That is if the media outlet has idiosyncratic preferences 'l ('r) it prefers a more leftist
(rightist) policy than the median voter. On the other hand, a media outlet of type
'0 has preferences over policies equal to the median voters ones. More specically, in the
following analysis a media outlet will be said to be unbiasedif 'n = '0:
24 A media outlet
23Clearly, in presence of uncertainty the distribution of voterspreference will be a convex combination
of such two extremedistributions.
24Notice that our results would not change assuming the presence of an unbiased media outlet with a
9
will be said to be leftist (rightist) if 'n = 'l ('n = 'r): Moreover, we assume the
possible bias of the leftist and rightist media outlet types to be symmetric. The probability
distribution of the media outlets preferences, g('n); is common knowledge and it is such
that Pr('n = 'l) = Pr('n = 'r) = y. That is, the media outlet is unbiased with probability
(1  2y) and has instead a bias j'n   xmj in a direction or another with probability y.25 At
this point, we should remark that we assume such symmetry in the media outlets types just
to avoid introducing any exogenous asymmetry in the benchmark model. In section 7 we
relax Assumption 1 by considering more realistic assumptions on the media outlets bias.
More specically, we show that the main results of the benchmark model do not change
when the media outlets types are asymmetric (i.e., the direction of the media outlets bias
is known to all the players), when there is just one media outlets type (i.e., there is no
uncertainty on the media outlets bias) or even when there are multiple media outlets.
It is also important to point out that the fact that the media outlet is just a political
actorin our model (i.e., it is not explicitly maximizing prots) is without loss of generality.
If the media outlet was a prot maximizer, given that in our model voters value unbiased
information, it would have a strictly dominant strategy of not slanting its reports. The model
would thus be equivalent to the case where the media outlet is unbiased with probability
one. On the other hand, if the media outlet was maximizing prots and at the same time it
had a political agenda, then it would care both about the true state of the world (which
is reected in the state-contingent public value component of its utility function) and about
its idiosyncratic preferences (which is reected in the private value component of its utility
function). Thus we can think of our specication of the media outlet utility function as
a reduced form of a model where the media outlet is a prot maximizer and at the same
time it has (possibly) an exogenous bias. Since we are mainly interested on how the media
outlets bias interacts with the endogenous bias arising from lobbiesinuence activities, we
will consider the media outlet preferences, and hence the media outlets bias, as exogenous.
Following the literature on media bias we can think of such exogenous bias as just arising
from journalists, editors, owners or advertisers idiosyncratic preferences (e.g., Djankov et al.
2003, Baron 2006, Anderson and McLaren 2007, Ellman and Germano 2008).
2.1 The game
There are two lobbies a and b who, by exerting e¤orts ea and eb respectively, compete to
a¤ect the distribution of a binary signal zi 2 fza; zbg that the media outlet receives on the
state of the world. Lobbies a and bs bliss points are a and b; respectively. We assume
purely public value utility function. That is, we could have dened as unbiased a media outlet with
no idiosyncratic preferences, thus having preferences d0 =

0 if s = A
1 if s = B
; That is our denition of unbiased
media outlet does not have to be rely on the median voters idiosyncratic preferences.
25Similarly to what we have specied regarding the distribution of votersidiosyncratic preferences, we
assume that supp g('n) = [; 1 ]: Nevertheless, notice that our results would generalize to the case where
supp g('n) = [0; 1].
10
lobbiespreferences to be extreme, a = 0 and b = 1: That is lobby a always prefers a
policy close to the left-hand side of the political space regardless of the state of the world
and similarly b always prefers a policy close to the right-hand side of the political space.
Then, lobby i quadratic utility function is:
Wi(P; i; ei) =   (P   i)2   C(ei) (4)
Where C is the cost function of e¤ort, which is assumed to be linear (i.e., C 0(e) = c > 0):26
The likelihood of the signal zi 2 fza; zbg received by the media outlet depends on the true
state of the world and on lobbiesinuence activities. We can interpret this as a situation
where both lobbies spend resources to produce/collect hard information in favor of their
preferred policy.27 The signal can be seen as a reduced form of media outlets investigative
journalism. In other words, the signal that the media outlet receives can be interpreted as
indicating whether the evidence that it collected in favor of a state of the world is stronger
than the one in favor of the other state (i.e., amount of hard information in favor of one state
higher than the one in favor of the other state). As we have pointed out in the introduction,
from a public valueperspective in both states each policy has costs and benets, however
the amount of such costs and benets di¤ers in the two states of the world. Thus lobbies
are able to nd hard information both on the benets and on the costs of each policy in
both states. Indeed for many issues we have mixedevidence on the e¢ ciency of a given
policy (e.g., the costs and benets of implementing the Kyotos protocol, the e¤ectiveness
of death penalty in preventing crime, the e¤ects of gun control on citizenssecurity and so
on). At the same time, the true state of the world plays a role in the evidence collected
by the media outlet. That is, ceteris paribus, it is more likely that the overall evidence will
be in favor of the lobby on the correct side. More specically, the probability that the
media outlet receives the correctsignal in a given state of the world is characterized by
the following functions:
ha(ea; eb;) = Pr(zajs = A; ea; eb;) (5)
hb(ea; eb;) = Pr(zbjs = B; ea; eb;) (6)
where the parameter  denotes the importance of the truthin this game. In other words,
the higher is  the greater the likelihood that the amount of hard information in support
of the true state of the world is higher than the one in support of the other state.28 The
26Notice that considering a convex cost function, C 0 > 0; C
00
> 0; would not change our results.
27Obviously, whenever a lobby nds an unfavorable piece of hard information it will always have an
incentive to conceal it. See Sobbrio (2009) for a simple model of collection of hard information by lobbies.
28How much higher such evidence is likely to be depends on the specic issue. We can think that issues
where the di¤erence between the cost-benet ratio of the bad policy and the one of the good policy
is very high are the ones were the evidence in favor of the correct state of the world is likely to be much
stronger. These are the issues where  is likely to be large (notice that also  is likely to be large since
voters would probably care more about knowing the true state of the world).
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assumptions on the properties of the signal probability function hi(ei; ej;) are summarized
by Condition 1.29
Condition 1 For 8i; j 2 fa; bg such that i 6= j; hi(ei; ej;) and hj(ei; ej;) are assumed
to satisfy the following properties:
i) hi(~e; e;) = hj(e; ~e;); 8e; ~e
ii) hi(ei; ej;) > 1  hj(ei; ej;)
iii) @hi
@ei
> 0; @hi
@
> 0; @hi
@ej
< 0
iv)

@2hi
@2ei
  @2hi
@2ej

< 0
Property i) is just a symmetry assumption on the signal probability functions. Property ii)
requires the signal to be informative.30 Property iii) is a straightforward necessary condition
to have an interior solution. Property iv) signies decreasing marginal productivity of e¤ort.
After having received the signal, the media outlet decides upon the (costless) message
mn 2 fma;mbg to send to the public (voters and parties).31 Hence, the game between the
media outlet and voters takes the form of a cheap-talk game. Indeed, as it is usually assumed
in the literature on media bias, the media outlet can slant its reports by selectively omitting
relevant information, that is by simply hiding unfavorable evidence (e.g., show the benets
and hide the costs of a given policy).
Given the message received from the media outlet, voters update their beliefs on the state
of the world according to Bayesrule. That is, they discount for the possible slant present in
the media outlets report arising from lobbiesinuence activities and media outlets bias.
Parties L and R take into account the e¤ect that media outlets report has on votersbeliefs
and then choose their political platform to maximize the number of votes. In the last stage
of the game, voters choose their most preferred policy between the platforms proposed by
the parties. The timing of the game is summarized below:
Lobbies a
and b exert
ea and eb
The media outlet
observes za or zb
and sends ma or mb
to voters and parties
Voters and
parties observe
mn and update
their beliefs
Parties L and
R announce
PL and PR
Voters cast their
ballot. Winning policy
is implemented and
payoffs are realized
Nature decides
s=A or s=B
and φn.
Figure 2. Timing of the game
29Section 5 provides a characterization of a signal probability function satisfying this condition.
30Notice that properties i) and ii) imply that hi(e; e;) = hj(e; e;) > 12 .
31It could appear restrictive to have a message space with just two elements given the uncertainty on
media outlets type. However, given that there are just two states of the world and the media outlet can
receive just two signals, votersuncertainty is just relative to such signals. For a similar cheap-talk model
where there is uncertainty on the senders type see Morris (2001).
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In what follows, we will refer to media outlets bias as the di¤erence between the media
outlet and the median voter idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., j'n   xmj). We will denote as
information slant the noise in the information that agents receive due to the presence of
media outlets bias and/or lobbiesinuence activities. Finally, we will indicate as policy
distortion the di¤erence between the policy outcome with and without information slant.
We now turn to the analysis of the strategic interactions among lobbies, the media outlet,
voters and parties and then derive the properties of the equilibria of the game.
3 The Interactions among Lobbies, the Media Outlet,
Voters and Parties
Since lobbiese¤orts are unobservable, we must solve for a rational expectation equilibrium
(REE) in which the media outlet, voters and parties correctly anticipate the optimal level of
e¤ort exerted by lobbies in equilibrium and all playersstrategies maximize their expected
utilities given their beliefs.
A rational expectation equilibrium of this game is a perfect bayesian equilibrium. In the
last stage voters update their beliefs according to Bayesrule, choose their most preferred
policy and vote for the platform closer to it. Parties anticipate such behavior and propose
platforms that maximize their chances of winning. The media outlet chooses its optimal
strategy taking into account how the message that it is going to send to the public (voters
and parties) will a¤ect the policy outcome. Finally, lobbies anticipating all such interactions
decide upon the e¤ort to exert in order to try to inuence the beliefs that voters will hold
on the state of the world.
3.1 Voters
Given the message received by the media outlet, mn 2 fma;mbg ; voters form their posterior
beliefs using Bayesrule and then decide their preferred policy platform. Thus, voters have
the following expected utility:
Ui(xi;mn) = Pr(s = Ajmn)
 (P   (xi ))2+ Pr(s = Bjmn)  (P   (xi+))2 (7)
Thus the policy that maximizes voter is expected utility is P i (mn) = argmax
P
Ui(xi;mn)
that is:
P i (mn) = xi +  [1  2Pr(s = Ajmn)] (8)
Individuals will, thus, simply vote for the proposed platform that is closer to their preferred
one. As usual, we assume that when the voter is indi¤erent between the two platforms, she
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simply randomizes between voting for party L and party R:32
Thus denoting as ri(PL; PR) the probability that individual i votes for party L given the
set of proposed platforms by the two parties, we have that a strategy for a voter is a function:
ri : P  P !

0;
1
2
; 1

3.2 Parties
Since the median voter is going to be pivotal in this model, parties platforms will simply
converge to the expected median voter position: In other words, parties L and R both know
that given message mn; the policy platform that maximizes the median voters expected
utility is P m(mn) = argmaxUm(P; xm;mn); where Um(P; xm;mn) is the median voters
expected utility. That is:
P m(mn) = xm +  [1  2Pr(s = Ajmn)] (9)
Thus P L(ma) = P

R(ma) = P

m(ma) and P

L(mb) = P

R(mb) = P

m(mb): In other words,
both partiesplatforms converge to the expected median voter preferred policy and they
both have probability of winning equal to 1
2
.33 Notice that, in any equilibrium where the
messages sent by media outlet are informative, such platforms are going to be contingent
on the specic message that the public (voters and parties) receives.34
3.3 The Media Outlet
The media outlet acts as a lterin this game. The private cost that any individual should
bear in order to acquire direct information is assumed to be higher than any private benet.
Hence, voters rely on media to receive information on a given issue.35 The expected utility
32Abstention is not allowed. However, given that voting is costless and all voters receive the same infor-
mation there would be no strategic abstention here. Moreover, even in presence of a positive cost of voting,
our model would still apply to the portion of population that would turnout in equilibrium (i.e., the median
voter policy would be dened on the subset of voters).
33The fact that parties are just o¢ ce-motivated and converge to the median voter position is without
loss of generality. Having parties that are both policy-motivated and o¢ ce-motivated would not change our
results in any signicant way.
34Again, using our example on the Kyotos protocol, this means that parties will choose platforms more
or less in favor of the protocol, depending on the message sent by the media outlet. Parties know that if the
media outlet sends a (credible) message stating that pollution has strong e¤ects on global warming, ceteris
paribus, voters will be more likely to vote for a policy in favor of Kyotos protocol.
35We believe that this assumption is realistic. Any single individual would nd too costly to read the
Kyoto protocol and evaluate whether its costs are higher than the benets or not. The opportunity cost
or simply the knowledge required to analyze such information would far exceed any private benet. News
media thus constitute the most e¢ cient (even though not perfect) way to acquire information for any single
citizen.
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for a media outlet having idiosyncratic preferences 'n is:
Un('n; zi; P ) = Pr(s = Ajzi)
 (P   ('n ))2+ Pr(s = Bjzi)  (P   ('n+))2
The media outlet observes the signal on the state of the world and updates its beliefs
according to Bayesrule. It then decides on the message to be sent to voters. Since the
media outlet has rational expectations, its posterior beliefs upon receiving signal za or zb
depend on the expected e¤ort that lobbies exert, e^a and e^b: Therefore the media outlet
posterior beliefs are as follows:
Pr(s = Ajza) = ha(e^a; e^b;)
ha(e^a; e^b;) + (1  hb(e^a; e^b;))(1  )
Pr(s = Ajzb) = (1  ha(e^a; e^b;))
(1  ha(e^a; e^b;)) + hb(e^a; e^b;)(1  )
The interaction between the media outlet and voters assumes here the typical structure
of a cheap-talk game. Denote the signal space as Z = fza; zbg and the message space as
M = fma;mbg : The media outlet will choose the message to be sent to voters in order
to maximize its expected utility. That is, by selectively omitting (i.e., hiding) unfavorable
evidence the media outlet is able to slant the evidence collected and send the message that
will make the median voter choose a policy as close as possible to its preferred policy P 'n(zi):
Where P 'n(zi) is simply the policy that maximizes Un(P; 'n; zi); that is:
P 'n(zi) = 'n +  [1  2Pr(s = Ajzi)] (10)
The, possibly mixed, strategy for a media outlet with preferences 'n is a mapping from the
signal space into a probability distribution over the set of possible messages:
('n) : Z ! (M)
Where  is the space of probability distribution over the message spaceM:More specically,
a media outlet with preferences 'n can have two di¤erent kinds of pure strategies, pooling or
separating respectively. We will say that a media outlet with preference 'n plays a pooling
strategy if ('njza) = ('njzb) = m: Instead, a media outlet with preference 'n is said
to play a separating strategy if ('njza) = m^ and ('njzb) = ~m; with ~m 6= m^: A mixed
strategy will simply specify the probability that a media outlet plays a separating strategy.
There are three possible kinds of informative equilibria in this game: two pure strategy
equilibria (partially informative, maximally informative) and one mixed strategy equilibrium
(semi-separating).36
36An analysis of the types of uninformative equilibria that can arise in this game is available upon request
to the author.
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Denition 1 An equilibrium is said to be partially informative if 9'n 2  such that
('njza) = ('njzb) and 9'h 2  with 'h 6= 'n such that ('hjza) 6= ('hjzb): An
equilibrium is said to be maximally informative if 8'n 2 ; ('njza) 6= ('njzb):
That is in a partially informative equilibrium some media outlet types choose a pooling
strategy and some others adopt a separating strategy. From these denitions, it is clear that
the only maximally informative equilibrium (that is the one where all agents in our economy
have the same information regarding the state of the world and thus share the same beliefs)
is the one where all media outlet types play a separating strategy.
Denition 2 An equilibrium is said to be semi-separating if 9'n 2  such that, for
p; q 2 [0; 1]:
('njza) =
(
ma with prob. q
mb with prob. (1  q)
; ('njzb) =
(
ma with prob. p
mb with prob. (1  p)
Clearly for p; q 2 f0; 1g ; a media outlet with idiosyncratic preferences 'n plays a de-
generate mixed strategy and the semi-separating equilibrium converges to a pure strategy
equilibrium.
The following lemma provides a characterization of the possible types of symmetric infor-
mative equilibria that can arise in this cheap-talk subgame.37
Lemma 1 9~'; 'l 2 [; 1  ] such that:
i) For all 'l < ~'l; there exists a partially informative equilibrium where the leftist
media outlet type pools on ma; the rightist media outlet type pools on mb and the unbiased
media outlet type adopts a separating strategy.
ii) For all 'l > 'l; there exists a maximally informative equilibrium where the leftist
and the rightist media outlet types adopt the same separating strategy of the unbiased media
outlet type.
iii) If 'l > ~'l; for all ~'l < 'l < 'l there exists a semi-separating equilibrium where
the leftist media outlet type sends message ma upon receiving signal za and sends ma with
probability q and mb with probability (1   q) upon receiving signal zb, the rightist media
outlet type sends message mb upon receiving signal zb and sends mb with probability q and
ma with probability (1 q) upon receiving signal za and the unbiased media outlet type adopts
a separating strategy.
That is, ~'l and 'l represent the leftist media outlet no-deviation thresholds in a partially
informative and maximally informative equilibrium, respectively.38 The above proposition
is thus showing that the unbiased media outlet type will never try to deceivethe median
voter by sending out a message that would induce her beliefs to be revised in a direction
37See Appendix B in Sobbrio (2009) for a discussion and characterization of these equilibria.
38Symmetric no-deviation thresholds exist for the rightist media outlet.
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opposite to the media outlets ones. Moreover, upon receiving a signal favorable to the lobby
of their side, the two biased media outlet types do not have any incentive to slant their
reports. Thus which equilibrium will ultimately arise in this cheap-talk subgame depends
on whether the biased media outlet types will nd optimal to adopt a separating strategy,
send the same message regardless of the signal received or mix between a separating and
a pooling strategy.39 As section 4.1 will show, the size of the media outlets idiosyncratic
bias and the endogenous level of e¤ort exerted by lobbies will, ultimately, determine which
of these equilibria will arise.
3.4 Lobbies
Lobbies anticipate that the platform the winning party will implement in equilibrium is the
one that maximizes the median voters utility. That is, lobbies know that the equilibrium
policy will depend on votersposterior beliefs and thus on the message of the media outlet.
Since voters have rational expectations their posterior beliefs upon receiving message mn
depend on the expected e¤ort that lobby a and b exert in a given equilibrium, e^a and e^

b
respectively. In other words, the median voters policy is a function of such expected e¤orts
levels:
P m(mn; e^

a; e^

b) = xm +  [1  2(s = Ajmn; e^a; e^b)] (11)
Thus from lobbiesex-ante perspective, conditional on the media outlet message, the im-
plemented policies are not a¤ected by their e¤ort decision. Therefore, lobbies choose their
e¤orts in order to inuence the signal that the media outlet receives and hence the message
that voters get. In other words, lobbiesexpected utilities depend on the exerted e¤orts
(which a¤ect Pr(ma) and Pr(mb)) and on the expected e¤orts (which a¤ect the median
voters preferred policy). Thus, from (4) lobby a and lobby b expected utilities are:
Wa(ea; eb; e^

a; e^

b ;) =  Pr(majea; eb;) (P m(ma; e^a; e^b ;))2 (12)
 Pr(mbjea; eb;) (P m(mb; e^a; e^b ;))2   C(ea)
Wb(ea; eb; e^

a; e^

b ;) =  Pr(majea; eb;) (1  P m(ma; e^a; e^b ;))2 (13)
 Pr(mbjea; eb;) (1  P m(mb; e^a; e^b ;))2   C(eb)
In their optimization problem lobbies take into account that the nal policy outcome, P m;
will depend on which message voters will receive from the media outlet. Moreover, lobbies
anticipate that such message depends on the possible media outlets bias and their expected
e¤orts. Thus each lobby faces a di¤erent optimization problem depending on whether it is
39Note that restricting the media outlet to always send a message is without loss of generality. Allowing
the media outlet to not send any message would not change our results in any signicant way. A formal
analysis of this case is available upon request to the author.
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expecting the equilibrium of the cheap talk game between media outlet and voters to be a
partially informative, semi-separating or maximally informative equilibrium.
4 Informative Equilibria
We now derive and characterize the possible equilibria of our game. Since we focus on
symmetric equilibria, from now on we assume  = 1
2
and xm = 12 : Moreover, in this section
we focus on the noise-increasing case. Hence we consider here a setting where the following
condition holds:
Noise-Increasing Condition

@hi
@ei

ei=ej
<
@hi@ej

ei=ej
(14)
That is we analyze the situation where an equal increase in lobbiese¤orts increases the
noise of the signal.40
4.1 Symmetric Equilibria
Lets analyze the optimal strategies of lobbies. From (11) and (12) lobby a optimality
conditions in amaximally informative, partially informative and semi-separating equilibrium
respectively, are:41
V MIa = 

@ha
@ea
  @hb
@ea

MI(s = Ajma)  MI(s = Ajmb)
  c = 0 (15)
V PIa = (1  2y)

@ha
@ea
  @hb
@ea

PI(s = Ajma)  PI(s = Ajmb)
  c = 0 (16)
V SSa = (1  2qy)

@ha
@ea
  @hb
@ea

SS(s = Ajma)  SS(s = Ajmb)
  c = 0 (17)
Where MI(s = Ajma) represents votersposterior beliefs in a maximally informative equi-
librium given that they received message ma and q is the probability that a biased media
outlet slants its reports in a semi-separating equilibrium.42 Notice that for q ! 1; the opti-
mality condition of the semi-separating equilibrium degenerates into the one of the partially
informative equilibrium. Viceversa, for q ! 0; this optimality condition converges to the
40In section 5 we provide a microfoundation of this property. See also Sobbrio (2009) for a simple model
of hard information showing that how lobbiesincentives to hide unfavorable evidence leads to such noise-
increasing property.
41A formal derivation of these FOCs and a formal analysis of lobbies a and bs reaction functions is
available upon request to the author.
42A similar interpretation applies to PI(s = Ajmn); SS(s = Ajmn); for 8mn 2M:
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one of the maximally informative equilibrium.43 The rst necessary step to understand the
interactions between lobbiesinuence activities and media outlets bias is to compare lob-
biese¤orts across equilibria. Let ePI ; eSS and eMI be the level of e¤ort that lobbies a and b
exert in a symmetric PI; SS and MI equilibrium respectively. Then we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Lobbies exert a lower e¤ort in an equilibrium where they expect the media outlet
to bias its report with a higher probability. Hence,
ePI < eSS < eMI
Moreover:
@eSS
@q
< 0 and lim
q!0
eSS = eMI ; lim
q!1
eSS = ePI
Therefore, the greater the likelihood that the media outlet adopts a pooling strategy, the
lower the incentives of lobbies to engage in inuence activities. Indeed, from an ex-ante
perspective when the media outlet chooses to disregard the information it collects (i.e., the
signal it receives on the state of the world), lobbies would just waste resources in trying
to inuence such information (i.e., signal). Viceversa, when the media outlet does not bias
its report and sends a message according to the signal it receives (maximally informative
equilibrium), lobbies have strong incentives to exert e¤ort to inuence the distribution of
this signal.
The second step is to determine how the media outlets incentives to slant its report
change as a function of lobbiese¤orts.
Lemma 3 The media outlet incentives to slant its reports are increasing in lobbiesexpected
e¤orts. Hence:
~'l < 'l
The higher the lobbies expected e¤orts the higher (in a probabilistic sense) the slant
that the media outlet will introduce in its report. Moreover, by rational expectations, in
equilibrium the expected e¤ort will be equal to the e¤ort exerted by lobbies. Therefore, since
the higher the e¤ort exerted by lobbies the more noisythe signal that the media outlet
receives, we can interpret this result as telling us that the more controversialand unclear
the information that media outlet collects are, the greater the likelihood that the media
outlet will slant such information. When instead lobbies do not engage in inuence activities
(i.e., ea = eb = 0), the media outlet receives the correct signal with high probability and thus
43Notice that 8q 2 [0; 1] the second order condition is:
(1  2qy)

@2ha
@2ea
  @
2hb
@2ea

SS(s = Ajma; e^SSa ; e^SSb )  SS(s = Ajmb; e^SSa ; e^SSb )

which is negative by condition 1. Thus the stationary point is a global maximum.
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it will slant such information only when it has very extreme preferences.44 Therefore, since
from lemma 2 we know that ePI < eMI the above reasoning implies that the leftist media
outlet no-deviation threshold in a PI equilibrium is lower than the one in a MI one (i.e.,
~'l < 'l). Hence, lemma 1, 2 and 3 are showing that the cheap-talk game, and therefore the
lobbying game, has a unique informative equilibrium depending on how large the possible
bias of the media outlet is. We thus have the following proposition characterizing the possible
types of equilibria of the game:
Proposition 1 For any given set  of media outlet idiosyncratic preferences, there is a
unique informative equilibrium. More specically:
i) If 'l 2 ['l; xm] there is a unique maximally informative equilibrium where each biased
media outlet type adopts a separating strategy and lobbies exert e¤ort eMI .
ii) If 'l 2 (~'l; 'l) there is a unique semi-separating equilibrium where each biased media
outlet type adopts a mixed strategy and lobbies exert e¤ort eSS.
iii) If 'l < ~'l there is a unique partially informative equilibrium where each biased media
outlet type pools on the message most preferred by the lobby on its side and lobbies exert
e¤ort ePI :
The following graph illustrates the possible types of equilibria that can arise depending
on where the media outlets idiosyncratic preferences lie:
Semi-Separating
Equilibrium
(Medium lobbies’ efforts)
rj
~
lj
~
I
lj rj 1-γγ
Semi-Separating
Equilibrium
(Medium lobbies’ efforts)
Partially Informative
Equilibrium
(Low lobbies’ efforts)
xm
Maximally Informative
Equilibrium
(High lobbies’ efforts)
Partially Informative
Equilibrium
(Low lobbies’ efforts)
Figure 3. Media Bias and Informative Equilibria.
Therefore, the higher the possible bias of the media outlet, the lower the equilibrium level
of e¤ort that lobbies will exert. Indeed, if the media outlet turn out to be strongly biased
in the opposite direction of the lobby, no matter how much e¤ort the lobby is going to exert
and whether it is lobbying for the e¢ cient policy or not, the media outlet will always send
a message that drives voters induced preferences further from the lobbys optimal policy.
Moreover, even if the media outlet turn out to be strongly biased in favor of the lobbys
optimal policy, lobbys e¤ort would be totally worthless by virtue of being unnecessary. In
44For example assuming that hi(0; 0;) = 1 and that xi is uniformly distributed, then for  = 14 the
leftist media outlet will never slant its report upon receiving message zb (since 'l =
1
4 =  and hence 'l
always greater than 'l): The same reasoning applies for the rightist media outlet. Notice that such result
hold in our cheap talk setting and thus it abstracts from any cost of slanting information.
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this case, it will be the media outlet that will take care of trying to inuence votersbeliefs
in a direction favorable to the lobby. Therefore, in either case, the possibility of facing a
very biased media outlet lowers the incentives of lobbies to spend resources to a¤ect the
signal distribution.
Notice that for intermediate values of the media outlets bias, an equilibrium in pure
strategies cannot exist. This is due to the discontinuity in the equilibrium level of e¤ort of
lobbies: for 'l < ~'l lobbies play according to a partially informative equilibrium and put
an e¤ort equal to ePI : Viceversa, for 'l = ~'l+ "; the leftist media outlet has an incentive to
deviate from its pooling strategy. However, this gives higher incentives to lobbies to exert a
higher level of e¤ort and thus increases the incentives of the media outlet to play a pooling
strategy. Therefore, for ~'l < 'l < 'l; the only possible equilibrium is a semi-separating
equilibrium where lobbies exert e¤ort eSS. Moreover, to any 'l in this interval corresponds
a unique optimal probability of the media outlet slanting its reports, q; which supports the
unique semi-separating equilibrium.
4.2 Distortion of the Policy Outcome and Welfare
We now analyze the e¢ ciency and welfare implications of this game. To simplify the analysis
we now assume, without loss of generality, the following:
Assumption 2. hi(0; 0;) = 1; 8i = a; b
In other words, we focus on the case where in absence of lobbies, there is no noise in the
signal that the media outlet receives. Thus, given Assumption 2, with no lobbiesinuence
activities and no news-slanting by the media outlet the equilibrium would be a fully
revealing one where voters learn the true state of the world and no distortion is present in
the implemented policy.
4.2.1 Distortion in the Policy Outcome
In order to evaluate the policy distortion arising from this game, we should compare the
policy outcomes that arise in a maximally informative (MI), partially informative (PI), and
semi-separating (SS) type of equilibrium with the one of a fully-revealing (FR) equilibrium.
From an ex-ante perspective, the expected policy outcome is the same in all types of equi-
libria of our game. On the other hand, the more voters care about the state of the world and
the higher the noise in the information that they receive, the higher will be the expected
policy distortion.
Proposition 2 In all types of equilibria of the game (PI; SS; MI), the expected policy
outcome is equal to the median voter idiosyncratic policy preference. The ex-ante policy
distortion is positively related with  and with the e¤ort exerted by lobbies in equilibrium
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(i.e., e). Moreover, in a PI and SS type of equilibrium, the ex-ante policy distortion is
also positively related with q and y:
Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective, lobbies inuence activities create an upward
distortion when the state of the world in A and a downward distortion when the state is
B: The expected policy distortion depends on the size of the state-contingent public value
component of the voter utility function (i.e., ). In other words, the more voters care about
receiving accurate information on the state of the world, the more noisy the information
they actually receive will be.
the e¢ ciency of the implemented policy, the higher the policy distortion. This result
suggests that we should expect, ceteris paribus, a higher policy distortion in an issue like
global warming than in an issue like abortion where preferences are mostly idiosyncratic.
On the other hand, the expected policy distortion also depends on the overall slant in the
message that voters receive from the media outlet. More specically, the media outlets
message contains two di¤erent kinds of slant. There is a source-drivenslant introduced
by lobbies in the signal that the media outlet receives (lobbies-induced slant). At the same
time, in a partially informative and semi-separating type of equilibrium, the media outlets
message contains also a supply-driven slant due to the idiosyncratic bias of the media
outlet (media-induced slant). Hence, the expected policy distortion is positively related
with the lobbies-induced slant (i.e., with the equilibrium level of e¤ort exerted by lobbies)
and also with the media-induced slant (i.e., with the probability of the media outlet slanting
its reports q and with the probability of the media outlet being biased y):
In any case, despite the fact that parties in our model do not introduce any distortion and
they simply implement the policy preferred by a majority of voters, there will be an ex-ante
distortion in the policy outcome. Even though voters are rational and discount the possible
presence of slant in the information they receive, the noise that lobbies and the media outlet
introduce in the political process prevents them from choosing the fully revealing optimal
policy.
4.2.2 Winners and Losers of the Inuence Game
We now analyze the welfare implications of the policy distortion derived in the previous
section. That is, we now focus on who is winning and who is losing in this inuence game.
Proposition 3 From an ex-ante perspective, all voters and the media outlet are always
worse o¤ in any type of equilibrium of the game (PI; SS;MI) than in a fully revealing
equilibrium. Their expected utility loss is larger the higher is the expected policy distortion.
Viceversa, lobbiesexpected utility gain is positively related with the expected policy distortion.
Hence, lobbies are better o¤ in any type of equilibrium of the game than in a fully revealing
equilibrium whenever the expected policy distortion is large enoughrelative to the cost of
e¤ort.
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Voters, regardless of their idiosyncratic preferences, would prefer an equilibrium without
any inuence activity. Moreover, their expected utility loss is larger the higher is the ex-
pected policy distortion. The same is true for the media outlet. One question that may
arise at this point is: why the media outlet does not ignore all the evidence produced by
lobbies since such evidence increases the overall noise of the signal? The problem is that
the media outlet simply cannot do that because lobbiese¤orts are not observable. That is,
the signal probability function hi(ea; eb;) is not invertible. In equilibrium, the media outlet
will correctly anticipate the e¤ort exerted by each lobby but it cannot distinguish between
the evidence coming from lobbies and the one coming from non-ideological sources. Indeed,
in reality it is not easy to distinguish between ideological and non-ideological think tanks
(or even between ideological and non-ideological oriented research within a think-tank).45
On the other hand, lobbies would prefer to commit to a no-lobbying equilibrium if and
only if the cost of e¤ort is too high compared with the possible gain from engaging in
inuence activities (expected distortion that they create in the policy outcome).46 On the
other hand, we should also point out that a very biased media outlet may represents a
commitment device for lobbies to not spend too many resources in this arm-wrestlegame
to inuence voters. Indeed, the ex-ante preferred outcome for lobbies is an uninformative
equilibrium where the media outlet always slants its reports.47
From an ex-post point of view (i.e., after the state of the world is realized), moderate
voters are still always losing from such game. Instead, extremist voters may be better o¤
when the policy that they like is not the one matchingthe true state of the world as the
following lemma shows.
Lemma 4 Let P Jm be the equilibrium policy outcome (where J = PI; SS;MI): Let xA =
1 +
(PJm )
2
and xB = 1 +
(PJm+)
2
: Then voter i is better o¤ in a fully revealing equilibrium
than in any type of equilibrium of the game (PI; SS;MI) if and only if one of the following
conditions is satised:
i) xA  xi  xB
ii) xi < xA and the state of the world is A
iii) xi > xB and the state of the world is B
Again, we can look at our example on the Kyotos protocol to understand the intuition
behind this result. Lets suppose that the state of the world is mild e¤ects of pollution on
global warming. Lemma 4 is suggesting that in such case a very environmentalist voter
45Moreover, in presence of reputation concerns the same would be true even considering a di¤erent model
where such e¤orts were observable. Lets say, for example, that an unbiased media outlet ignores the overall
evidence coming from lobbies suggesting that pollution has strong e¤ects on global warming. Ex-post such
behavior may be the same as the one of a biased rightist media outlet. Hence, if the media outlet has
reputation concerns, it may not want to disregard the evidence produced by lobbies.
46Notice that, if we were to consider an utilitarian social welfare function giving equal weights to each
voter, the media outlet and lobbies, the net e¤ect of this inuence game on social welfare would clearly be
negative.
47A formal proof of this result is available upon request to the author.
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would prefer any type of equilibrium of the game, where the median voter chooses a policy
more in favor of the Kyotos protocol, to a fully revealing equilibrium where the median
voter would choose a policy less in favor of the Kyotos protocol.
4.3 Media Bias, Policy Distortion and Welfare
In the previous section we have derived and discussed the distortion in the policy outcome
and its e¤ects on the expected utilities of players regardless of which equilibrium is actually
in place (i.e., regardless of the actual size of the possible bias of the media outlet). In this
session we instead analyze the e¤ect that the media outlets bias has on the policy distortion
and on the welfare of voters, lobbies and of the media outlet itself.48 This will allow us to
answer the following questions: is a larger idiosyncratic bias of the media outlet always
associated with a higher policy distortion? Moreover, if voters and lobbies could decide how
large the possible bias of the media outlet should be, what would be the optimal media
biasfrom their perspectives?
When there are no lobbiesinuence activities taking place, the presence of media bias
always increases the expected policy distortion hence it always has a negative impact on
the e¢ ciency of the political outcome. However, when lobbies come into play this is not
necessarily true anymore. As the following proposition shows, the expected policy distortion
may be lower in a type of equilibrium where the biased media outlet types slant their reports
than in one where they do not.
Proposition 4 The expected policy distortion and the expected utility of voters are higher
in a MI type of equilibrium than in a PI type of equilibrium if and only if y < h
PI hMI
2hPI 1 :
Lobbies have a higher expected utility in a MI type of equilibrium than in a PI one if and
only if y < 1
2

1 
p
2(2hMI 1)2 [c(ePI) c(eMI)]
(2hPI 1)

:
In other words, it is not possible to say a priori whether the ex-ante policy distortion
is larger in a PI or MI type of equilibrium.49 The expected policy distortion depends
on  but it also depends on the informativeness of the message that voters receive from
the media outlet. That is, the expected policy distortion is positively related with the
slant in the information that voters receive, which is di¤erent in the di¤erent types of
equilibria. More specically, as we have pointed out in section 4.2.1 the overall slant present
in the media outlets message derive from two di¤erent types of slants: the lobbies-induced
slant and the media-induced slant. Voters know that when the possible bias of the media
outlet is low, the media outlet always sends truthful reports (i.e., it will not slant the
48Without loss of generality we assume, as in the previous section, that Assumption 2 holds.
49A similar intuition applies to the policy distortion in a SS equilibrium with respect to the one in a
MI equilibrium. Notice that hPI also depends on y trough ePI : Therefore, whether y < h
PI hMI
2hPI 1 or not
will ultimately depend on the parameters of the model and on the functional form of the signal likelihood
function (i.e., h(ea; eb;)):
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information it received). However, in this case lobbies have strong incentives to exert e¤ort.
Therefore, the message that voters receive in a maximally informative equilibrium has no
media-induced slant but it incorporates a high lobbies-induced slant. Instead, the message
that voters observe in a partially informative equilibrium contains a high media-induced
slant (in a probabilistic sense) and a low lobbies-induced slant. Therefore the expected
policy distortion in a partially informative equilibrium is lower than the one in a maximally
informative equilibrium when the lobbies-induced slant is higher than the media-induced
slant. Intuitively, if lobbies introduce lots of noise in the signal that the media outlet receives,
voters would discount this and thus they would not give much credit even to a report coming
from an unbiased media outlet. If instead voters are in a partially informative equilibrium
where lobbies exert a low level of e¤ort, they may buyrelatively more the media outlet
report (provided that they believe the media outlet being biased with a low probability).
That is, in presence of lobbiesinuence activities, a higher bias of the media outlet may
ultimately lead to a lower policy distortion by lowering the lobbies-induced slant.
Similarly, it is not possible to say a priori in which type of equilibrium voters would
prefer to be. Since the strength of the lobbies-induced slant and the media-induced slant are
inversely related across types of equilibria, voters would prefer a PI equilibrium to a MI
one whenever the lobbies-induced slant is stronger than the media-induced one. In other
words, from an ex-ante point of view, voters may sometimes prefer to face a potentially very
biased media outlet. Indeed, such type of media outlet may discourage lobbies to engage
in inuence activities and hence may ultimately lead to a higher quality of information and
lower policy distortion.50 On the other hand, lobbies a and bs ranking of equilibria is
opposite to the votersone. Lobbies prefer a PI equilibrium to aMI one, provided that the
media-induced slant is strong enough. Moreover, the higher the cost of e¤ort the greater the
likelihood that lobbies would prefer to face a media outlet with a large possible bias (since
ePI < eMI):
In the next section we propose a possible characterization of the competition between
lobbies and thus of the signal probability function which provides a microfoundation of the
noise-increasing property of lobbiese¤orts.
5 The State Contingent Contest between Lobbies
5.1 Racing for evidence
Following the innovation race literature we model the competition between lobbies as a
race for evidencewhere one of them has an advantage over the other.51 That is, lobbies
50Notice that while ex-ante voters may prefer the possible bias of the media outlet to be large, after the
media outlet has received the signal on the state of the world, voters would always want it to not slant its
reports. That is, an unbiased media outlet could never credibly commit to play a pooling or mixed strategy.
51For an extensive review of this literature see Reinganum (1989).
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have di¤erent hazard rates depending on whether they are lobbying for the goodcause or
not.52 To simplify notation let the state of the world be s 2 fa; bg. Thus assuming the time
at which each lobby wins the race,  ; being exponentially distributed, we have the following:
Pr((ei)  tjs = i) = 1  exp f (ei +)g (18)
Pr((ej)  tjs = i) = 1  exp f  (ej) g (19)
That is to say, for  ! 0; if the state of the world is s = i; then lobby i will win the contest
and thus have the media outlet receiving signal zi with an instantaneous probability equal
to ei+; where  is a positive parameter measuring the importance of the true state of the
world in the contest. Viceversa, lobby j will have an instantaneous probability of winning
the contest simply equal to ej:
If we dene vizi (v
i
zj
) as the net expected benet that lobby i gets when signal zi (zj) is
realized, we have that lobby i expected payo¤ in this state contingent contest will be:
Wi(ei; ej;; v
i
zi
; vizj js = i) =
1Z
0
vizi(ei+) exp f  (ej) tg exp f (ei+)tg dt+
+
1Z
0
vizjej exp f  (ej) tg exp f (ei+)tg (ei+)dt
That is:
Wi(ei; ej;; v
i
zi
; vizj js = i) = vizi
ei +
ei + ej +
+ vizj
ej
ei + ej +
(20)
Thus we have the following probabilities of media outlet receiving signal zi or zj when the
state of the world is s = i:
hi(ei; ei;) = Pr(zijs = i) = ei +
ei + ej +
(21)
1  hi(ei; ei;) = Pr(zjjs = i) = ej
ei + ej +
(22)
These winningprobabilities are a straightforward generalization of the ones of the Contest-
Success Function (CSF) introduced by Tullock (1980) and axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996).
The contest success function captures a wide range of situations where players put an e¤ort to
win a prize. In our setting this prize is going to be the signal received by the media outlet.53
It is immediate to verify that this State Contingent Contest-Success Function (SCCSF) sat-
ises all the properties of Condition 1 and it also incorporates the noise-increasing property
of lobbiese¤orts.
52In other words, lobbies are going to have a state contingenthazard rates:
(eijs = i) = ei + and (ej js = i) = ej
53A detailed and formal characterization of the properties of this State Contingent Contest-Success Func-
tion (SCCSF) is available upon request to the author.
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5.2 Comparative Statics
We now discuss the e¤ects that a change in the parameters of the model has on lobbies
inuence activities and on the probability of news-slantingby the media outlet.
Proposition 5 In all the types of equilibria of the game, a higher  leads to a higher level
of lobbiese¤orts and a weakly lower probability of news-slantingby the media outlet.
An increase in the importance of the public value component in the votersutility function
has two e¤ects. A higher  implies a larger space for inuence, therefore the higher is
 the stronger lobbiesincentives to try to inuence votersbeliefs (higher lobbies-induced
slant). On the other hand, a higher  also decreases the relative importance of the media
outlets idiosyncratic bias. Hence the higher is  the lower the media outlets incentives to
slant its reports (lower media-induced slant). Therefore, a higher  has opposite e¤ects on
the incentives of lobbies and of the media outlet: it increases the lobbies-induced slant and
it reduces the media-induced slant.
Proposition 6 In all the types of equilibria of the game, a higher c and a higher y both
result in a lower level of lobbiese¤orts and/or a lower probability of news-slantingby the
media outlet.
An increase in c has a direct and an indirect e¤ect. It decreases lobbies incentives to
exert e¤ort and thus it increases the quality of the signal received by the media outlet.
As a consequence the media outlet has lower incentives to slant its reports. However, this
last e¤ect increases lobbies incentives to exert e¤ort. Thus the direct and indirect e¤ect
of an increase in c on lobbiese¤orts go in opposite directions. Nevertheless, the net e¤ect
on the slant in information is always negative. Notice that in some cases (e.g., in a SS
equilibrium), the net e¤ect of an increase in c on lobbies e¤orts is null (the direct and
indirect e¤ects cancel each other). Thus in such cases an increase in c has a positive e¤ect
on the e¢ ciency of the policy outcome not because it decreases the lobbies-induced slant
but because it decreases the media-induced slant. Therefore, our result implies that public
policy measures aimed at increasing the cost of lobbies inuence activities (e.g., a linear tax
on lobbying) would reduce the policy distortion and increase voterswelfare. Indeed, such
measures would either reduce lobbiesinuence activities or reduce news-slantingby the
media (in a probabilistic sense) or reduce both.54
A similar e¤ect and similar reasoning applies to an increase probability of the media outlet
being biased, i.e., y: The policy outcome would be more e¢ cient if everyone would attribute
a low probability to the media outlet being unbiased. Thus knowing for sure that the media
outlet is indeed biased would actually lead to a lower policy distortion.
54This result can also be reintepreted in the light of proposition 3. That is, imposing more strict academic
and deontological requirements for think tanks research would improve the welfare of voters and of the
media outlet by making it easier for the media outlet to distinguish between ideological and non-ideological
sources of information.
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6 Accuracy-Increasing Lobbies
Until now we have assumed that the overall nete¤ect of lobbiesinuence activities is to
increase the noise in the information that the media outlet collects (noise-increasing lobbies).
Moreover, we have also derived endogenously this property by modeling the competition
between lobbies as a race for evidence(see section 5).
Now we instead discuss the other possible case where lobbiese¤orts have a positive net
e¤ect on the accuracyof the signal. That is, the case where the more e¤ort lobbies put
in a (symmetric) equilibrium, the greater the likelihood that the media outlet will collect
correct information.55 Thus, we consider here a setting where the following condition holds:
Accuracy-increasing condition

@hi
@ei

ei=ej
>
@hi@ej

ei=ej
(23)
In presence of accuracy-increasing lobbies, a higher probability of the media outlet slanting
its reports corresponds to a lower equilibrium level of lobbiese¤orts.56 Thus, similarly to
the noise-increasing case, lobbies nd more productive to engage in inuence activities in
presence of a media outlet with a small bias. However, in this accuracy-increasing case,
since the lower the media-induced slant the higher the lobbies-induced accuracy, multiple
equilibria exist for intermediate values of the media outlets bias (one with low and one with
high lobbiese¤orts).57 The following graph characterizes the possible types of informative
equilibria that can arise as a function of the media outlets bias.
j# l j* l
I
j# rj* r 1-γγ
Multiple Equilibria
(PI and MI)
(Low or High lobbies’effort)
Partially Informative
Equilibrium
(Low lobbies’ effort)
xm
Maximally Informative
Equilibrium
(High lobbies’ effort)
Partially Informative
Equilibrium
(Low lobbies’ effort)
Multiple Equilibria
(PI and MI)
(Low or High lobbies’effort)
Figure 4. Media Bias and Informative Equilibria (Accuracy-Increasing case)
55Notice also that this case could be seen as an application of the model of Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999) in a setting where there is a third party (i.e., the media outlet) ltering the information between the
advocatesand the decision maker.
56Notice that when y is small an alternative pattern of types of equilibria may also exist. In such pattern
there is a positive correlation between lobbiese¤orts and the probability of media outlet slanting its reports.
57For large values of the media outlets bias, an increase or decrease in lobbiese¤orts would not a¤ect
the media outlet equilibrium strategy. A similar reasoning applies when the media outlets bias is small. A
formal analysis of this accuracy increasing case is available upon request to the author.
28
7 Extensions
In this section we briey describe and discuss several possible extensions of our benchmark
model.58
7.1 Known direction of the media outlets bias
We consider here a more realistic assumption on the beliefs about the media outlets bias with
respect to the benchmark model. That is, the situation where the direction of the media
outlets bias is common knowledge but the strength of such bias is private information.
Suppose, for example, that parties, voters and lobbies knows that the media outlet is leftist
but they do not know how much leftist it is. That is, let the space of possible media
outlet types be  =

'Hl ; '
L
l
	
with 'Hl < '
L
l < xm and Pr('n = '
H
l ) = y. That is, with
probability y the media outlet has a largeleftist bias and with probability (1  y) it has
a smallleftist bias.
When lobbies are ex-ante symmetric their incentives to exert e¤ort remain symmetric even
though the media outlet possible strategies are not symmetric. To understand why this is
true, lets focus on a partially informative equilibrium where the smallbias type adopts a
separating strategy and the largebias type adopts a pooling one. From the rightist lobbys
perspective, exerting an e¤ort to inuence the information that the media outlet collects is a
waste with probability y (probability of largebias type) and is productive with probability
(1  y): Similarly, from the leftist lobbys point of view, exerting e¤ort is unnecessary (and
thus a waste) with probability y and it is productive with probability (1   y). Therefore,
asymmetries in the media outlets bias do not generate asymmetric incentives and thus the
equilibrium remains symmetric.
7.2 No uncertainty on the media outlets bias
Suppose now that voters, lobbies and politicians are all informed about the exact bias of
the media outlet (i.e., the media outlets bias is common knowledge). When the media
outlet has a large bias it would like to slant its reports. Therefore, voters would disregard
the message coming from a very biased media outlet because simply uninformative. On the
other hand, in such uninformative equilibrium lobbies would have no incentives to engage in
inuence activities, thus the signal that a very biased media outlet receives is very likely to
be correct. From lemma 3 we know that in such case the media outlet has lower incentives
to adopt a pooling strategy and thus it does so only when it has a very large bias. Hence, for
intermediate values of the media outlets bias the unique equilibrium is still a semi-separating
one. Moreover, in such equilibrium lobbies exert a lower e¤ort with respect to the one they
exert in the benchmark case because of the certainty of facing a biased media outlet. Hence,
58Detailed formal proofs for these extensions are available upon request to the author.
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our model shows that a (not too much) biased media outlet may a¤ect the policy outcome
even in presence of rational, Bayesian consumers who know its bias. On the other hand,
when the media outlet has a very high bias, the unique equilibrium is an uninformative one
where voters do not modify their beliefs and lobbies exert no e¤ort.59 Finally, for low values
of the media outlets bias the unique equilibrium is still a maximally informative one. The
following graph illustrates the possible types of equilibria as a function of the media outlets
bias:
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Figure 5. Equilibria with no uncertainty on the media outlets bias.
7.3 Multiple Media Outlets
Suppose that there are two media outlets with idiosyncratic preferences '1n and '
2
n: Denote
m1 the message of the rst media outlet and m2 the one of the second media outlet. Since
voters value unbiased information, when updating their beliefs they take into account the
message with the lowest slant. Therefore, whenever one of the two media outlets adopts
a separating strategy, the unique equilibrium is a maximally informative one regardless of
the type and size of the other media outlets bias. The more interesting cases arise when
the two media outlets have biases going in opposite directions and such biases are not
small (i.e., the equilibrium is not a maximally informative one). Suppose for example,
that the rst media outlet is leftist and the second is rightist. Suppose also, without loss
of generality, that their idiosyncratic preferences are symmetric with respect to the ones of
the median voter (i.e., j'1n   xmj = j'2n   xmj). Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, upon
receiving signal zb; (za) the leftist (rightist) media sends message mb (ma) with probability
(1  q) and message ma (mb) with probability q; where q 2 (0; 1]: Thus, when the two media
outlets receive signal za; with probability (1   q) both of them send message ma, in which
case voters would infer the signal received by the media outlets. At the same time, with
probability q the two media outlets send opposite messages in which case voters would not
get any information from media reports (i.e., their posterior beliefs is equal to their prior).
59Notice that this case highlights the fundamental di¤erence between a media outlet and a lobby. If
the media outlet were to have extreme preferences (as the ones of a lobby), its reports would simply be
uninformative and thus it would neither have any policy inuence nor get any prots from readers and/or
advertisers.
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The exact same reasoning applies when the two media outlets receive signals zb. Therefore,
with probability (1  q) lobbiese¤orts are very productive and with probability q they are
completely unproductive. Hence, in presence of two media outlets, lobbies still put less e¤ort
the more they expect the media outlets to slant their reports. Moreover, media outlets still
have higher incentives to slant their reports, the higher lobbiese¤orts are. Therefore, the
main intuitions of the benchmark model carry out in the two media outlet case.
Notice that, in the limiting case where there is a large number of media outlets, there is
a probability close to one that at least two media outlets having biases going in opposite
directions report the same message. That is, in this case voter would know the signal
received by media and the equilibrium would converge to a maximally informative one.60
7.4 Unbiased media outlet (unlteredcommunication)
The case where the media outlet is unbiased with probability one is equivalent to a situation
where there is no such lteras media and voters receive a direct signal on the state of
the world. Thus, nested in our model is the case where lobbies communicate directly with
voters. An obvious example where such situation arises is when lobbies compete by engaging
in informative advertising (e.g., issue advertisement). In this case, the signal that voters
receive can be interpreted as which informative content of the advertisements is stronger.
From lemma 1 we know that, in any informative equilibrium, when the media outlet is
unbiased it never slants its reports. Therefore, the equilibrium with an unbiased media
outlet is equivalent to a maximally informative one. Hence, even when the media outlet has
no bias, the information that voters receive is still slanted and there is a distortion in the
policy outcome, due to the presence of lobbiesinuence activities.61
7.5 Single Lobby
We discuss here the case where there is just one lobby engaging in inuence activities. We
can think of such situation being the limiting case where there are two asymmetric lobbies.
Without loss of generality suppose the unique lobby to be the leftist one (lobby a). In such
case, the rightist media outlet is more willing to slant its reports than a leftist media outlet (in
a probabilistic sense), despite having the same ex-ante bias. There is a simple reason behind
this asymmetry in the behavior of the leftist and rightist media outlet types. If the leftist
media outlet receives signal zb; then given that lobby a engaged in inuence activities to
decrease the likelihood of such signal, it will consider this signal very informative. Therefore,
the leftist media outlet will have, ceteris paribus, low incentives to disregard signal zb and
adopt a pooling strategy. On the other hand, if the rightist media outlet receives signal
za; then given the presence of lobby as inuence activities, it will not consider this signal
60Which as shown by proposition 4 does not necessarily lead to a higher voterswelfare with respect to a
SS or PI type of equilibrium.
61See proposition 2.
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very informative. Therefore a rightist media outlet will have high incentives to disregard
such signal and choose a pooling strategy. Hence, despite having the same ex-ante bias, a
media outlet on the opposite side of the lobby may appear relatively more biased than the
one on same side of the lobby, since it is more likely to slant its reports. This result has an
immediate implication for empirical studies aiming at measuring media bias. In presence of
asymmetries between lobbies, a reliable measure of the bias of a media outlet should take
into account the equilibrium di¤erence between the ex-post slant in a media outlets reports
and the ex-ante bias of the media outlet itself.
8 Conclusions
Voters, parties, news media and lobbies are important actors involved in every democratic
political process. These actors are intrinsically related to each other and the nal political
outcome will be the result of the mutual interactions among all of them. We have devel-
oped a simple model to analyze some of these interactions that have been overlooked in
the literature. Lobbies spend hundreds of millions of dollars every year to advocate their
positions. This is especially true on issues where the cost of choosing a policy di¤erent
from the median voters one would be too high for any politician (ideological/single issue
527 groups). In such cases lobbiesmain channel of inuence is through voters. Given that
voters decide on the optimal policy based on their idiosyncratic preferences and their beliefs
on the expected benets and costs of alternative policies, lobbies will succeed in altering
the implemented policy as long as they manage to alter such beliefs. In our setting the role
of a media outlet is to collect information on the costs and benets of a given policy and
then lter this information according to its idiosyncratic preferences. Even though voters
and the media outlet are rational and they account for the presence of lobbies inuence
activities, the ex-ante slant of information (signals) by lobbies will result in a distortion of
the equilibrium policy. The policy will be sub-optimal in the sense that it will not be exactly
shaped on the true state of the world.
The bias of the media outlet and lobbiese¤orts show a quite interesting relationship. The
higher the possible bias of the media outlet the lower lobbiese¤orts. This result derives
from the fact that lobbiese¤orts are less productivethe more likely the media outlet is
to slant its reports. Indeed a very biased media outlet on the same side of the lobby will
make the lobbys e¤ort unnecessary. Instead, a very biased media outlet on the opposite
side will simply make lobbys e¤ort unproductive. Either way, the greater the likelihood
that the media outlet will slant its reports the lower the incentives of lobbies to inuence
the information that the media outlet collects. On the other hand, the lower the lobbies
e¤orts the less likely, ceteris paribus, is the media outlet to slant its reports. Despite the fact
that the media outlet does not incur any cost in manipulating the information it collects
(i.e., the media outlet is a cheap-talker), it still has lower incentives to slant its reports upon
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receiving a very informative signal (i.e., when lobbies exert a low level of e¤ort).
From an ex-ante welfare point of view, this inuence game negatively a¤ects all players
but lobbies. All voters and every media outlet type face a net expected loss from the policy
distortion generated by media bias and/or lobbiesinuence activities. More specically, the
more voters care about receiving accurate information, the more noisy will be the information
that they end up receiving and so the higher will be their expected utility loss. Lobbies
instead expect to benet from this game as long as the policy distortion induced by their
inuence activities is large enough with respect to the cost of e¤ort. At the same time, our
analysis shows that in presence of lobbiesinuence activities, a higher idiosyncratic bias of
the media outlet is not necessarily associated with a higher policy distortion and a lower
voterswelfare. On the other hand, the comparative statics results on the State Contingent
Contest-Success Function (SCCSF) show that public policy measures aimed at increasing
the cost of lobbiese¤orts would reduce lobbiesinuence activities and/or reduce news-
slantingby the media (in a probabilistic sense). Thus, the introduction of a proportional
tax on lobbying would reduce the distortion in the policy outcome and increase voters
welfare.
We have also shown that our main results are robust to di¤erent assumptions on the bias
of the media outlet. That is assuming that every player knows the direction of the media
outlets bias or that there is no uncertainty on such bias or even that there are multiple
media outlets, does not generate asymmetric incentives for lobbies to engage in inuence
activities. At the same time, we have also pointed out that a (not too much) biased media
outlet may a¤ect the policy outcome even in presence of rational, bayesian consumers who
know its bias.
On the other hand, we have shown that asymmetries between lobbies (e.g., the presence of
only one lobby) induces asymmetries in the behavior of di¤erent media outlet types. When
only the leftist lobby is engaging in inuence activities, for a given ex-ante bias, a rightist
media outlet will be more likely to slant its reports than a leftist one. As a consequence, by
just observing the news reports, the rightist media outlet may appear more biased than the
leftist one. This suggests that empirical studies aimed at measuring media bias that just
focus on the slant in media reports, may be misleading. In other words, such measurements
may capture the ex-post slant in a media outletreports rather than the ex-ante bias of the
media outlet itself.
This analysis was intended to shed light on some of the relationships between lobbies,
media and voters. Future research should probably consider a more active role of media.
Nevertheless, the message of the paper remains. Lobbies can distort the political outcome
even when they do not interact directly with politicians. Rational voters discount the
reports they receive from the media outlet by taking into account the presence of news-
slantsarising from lobbiesinuence activities and media bias. However, the nal policy
outcome is still suboptimal and a distortion is present in the political platform that the
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winning party implements. This suggests that the recent lobbying reform laws in the US,
just focused on tackling the distortions deriving from the interactions between lobbyists and
politicians, have overlooked a potentially large source of news-slant and, ultimately, of
policy ine¢ ciency.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us rst introduce the following notation:
Let the posterior beliefs of voters upon having received message ma and mb respectively be: (s =
Ajma) = r and (s = Ajmb) = t:
Assume without loss of generality that r > t: Then in any informative equilibrium it must be
the case that ('0jza) = ma and ('0jzb) = mb: We prove this by contradiction. That is
assume that upon receiving signal za the unbiased media outlet sends message mb: The posterior
beliefs of voters would be (s = Ajmb) = t and the policy implemented in equilibrium would
be P m(mb) = xm +  (1  2t). Viceversa, if media outlet were to send message ma; the policy
outcome would be P m(ma) = xm +  (1  2r) : Notice that since by assumption r > t, then
P m(ma) < P m(mb): Hence, the unbiased media outlet would send message mb instead of ma as
long as: P m(mb)  P '0(za) < P m(ma)  P '0(za)
where P '0(za) = '0 +  [1  2Pr(s = Ajza)] : Given that P m(ma) < P m(mb) by monotonicity the
above inequality is equivalent to:
P m(mb) + P

m(ma)  2P '0(za) < 0
and since by denition '0 = xm; this reduces to 2Pr(s = Ajza) < r + t: Moreover from Condition
1, Pr(s = Ajza) > Pr(s = Ajzb): Thus, since r is a convex combination of Pr(s = Ajza) and
Pr(s = Ajzb) then r 2 [0;Pr(s = Ajza)]: However since by assumption t < r then (r + t) 2
[0; 2Pr(s = Ajza)); which contradicts the above condition.62 Lets now focus on the leftist and
rightist media outlet. It must be the case that in any informative equilibrium ('ljza) = ma and
('rjzb) = mb: We prove this for the leftist media outlet (by contradiction). Suppose that upon
receiving za, the leftist media outlet sends message mb: For such strategy to be optimal it must be
the case that: P m(mb)  P 'l(za) < P m(ma)  P 'l(za) :
Where P 'l(za) = 'l +  [1  2Pr(s = Ajza)]. Given that P m(ma) < P m(mb) by monotonicity this
condition is equivalent to:
P m(mb) + P

m(ma)  2P 'l(za) < 0
That is 2(xm   'l) + 2 + 2 (2Pr(s = Ajza))  (t+ r)) < 0 and we know from Condition 1 that
Pr(s = Ajza) > Pr(s = Ajzb): Thus since r is going to be a convex combination of Pr(s = Ajza)
and Pr(s = Ajzb) then r 2 [0;Pr(s = Ajza)]: However since by assumption t < r then (r + t)
2 [0; 2Pr(s = Ajza)); and given that xm > 'l the condition will never hold. A similar proof applies
to the rightist media outlet. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
We show here that eMI < eSS ; a similar proof applies to show that eSS < ePI : In a sym-
metric equilibrium since ea = eb = e then ha(e; e;) = hb(e; e;) = h; where h de-
note the probability of receiving the correct signal given that both lobbies exert e¤ort e:
Moreover, by rational expectations, in any equilibrium e^a = e^b = e. Therefore, given that
the posterior beliefs of voters in a symmetric maximally informative equilibrium are such that
MI(s = Ajma; e^MIa ; e^MIb )  MI(s = Ajmb; e^MIa ; e^MIb ) = 2hMI   1: Similarly in a semi-separating
62A similar proof applies to show that the unbiased media outlet is never indi¤erent between sending out
the two messages.
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equilibrium SS(s = Ajma; e^SSa ; e^SSb )  SS(s = Ajmb; e^SSa ; e^SSb ) = (1  2qy)
 
2hSS   1. Thus the
equilibrium conditions become:
VMIa = 

@ha
@ea
  @hb
@ea
 
2hMI   1  c = 0
V SSa = (1  2yq)2

@ha
@ea
  @hb
@ea
 
2hSS   1  c = 0
Now we can prove that eMI > eSS . Suppose not, that is eMI < eSS . We denote
La(e
MI) =

@ha(e
MI ; eMI ;)
@ea
  @hb(e
MI ; eMI ;)
@ea
 
2hMI   1
and
La(e
SS) =

@ha(e
SS ; eSS ;)
@ea
 @hb(e
SS ; eSS ;)
@ea
 
2hSS   1
In an interior equilibrium we must have that VMIa = V
SS
a = 0: Thus given that the marginal cost of
e¤ort is constant and that (1  2yq) < 1 it must be the case that La(eMI) < La(eSS).63 Moreover,
by (14)
d

@hi(e;e;)
@ei
  @hj((e;e;)
@ei

de < 0. Thus since e
MI < eSS :
@ha(e
MI ; eMI ;)
@ea
  @hb(e
MI ; eMI ;)
@ea

>

@ha(e
SS ; eSS ;)
@ea
 @hb(e
SS ; eSS ;)
@ea

therefore it must be the case that
 
2hMI   1 <  2hSS   1 : Thus, a necessary condition to
have eMI < eSS is hSS > hMI ; but this contradicts (14). A similar proof applies to show that
eSS > ePI . Moreover, limq!0 La(eSS) = La(eMI); and
@V SSa
@q < 0; thus it must be the case that
@eSS
@q < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider:
~'l = xm 

PI(s = Ajma) + PI(s = Ajmb)  2Pr (s = Ajzb)

Now lets focus on the term inside the brackets. Since in a symmetric PI equilibrium ha(e^PIa ; e^
PI
b ;) =
hb(e^
PI
a ; e^
PI
b ;) = h(e^
PI ; e^PI ;); with a slight abuse of notation we denote h(e^PI ;) = hPI : Hence
by the symmetry of the equilibrium PI(s = Ajma) + PI(s = Ajmb) = 1 and:
Pr (s = Ajzb) =
(1  ha(e^PIa ; e^PIb ;)) 
(1  ha(e^PIa ; e^PIb ;))

+ (hb(e^PIa ; e^
PI
b ;))
= (1  hPI)
Thus:
~'l = xm   

1  2(1  h(e^PI ; e^PI ;))
Similarly:
'l = xm   

1  2(1  h(e^SS ; e^SS ;))
'l = xm   

1  2(1  h(e^MI ; e^MI ;))
In other words, the equilibrium no-deviation thresholds of the media outlet depends on the pa-
rameters of the model and on the expected e¤ort exerted by lobbies. It is straightforward to see
that by (14): @~'l@e^ > 0;
@'l
@e^ > 0;
@'l
@e^ > 0: Now we want to show that 8q 2 (0; 1) 'l > 'l and 'l >
63Notice that a similar proof would apply with a convex cost function, that is c00(e) > 0
38
~'l. Suppose not. Then 8q 2 (0; 1) 'l < 'l which implies that hMI > hSS . Moreover, by rational
expectations, in equilibrium e^MI = eMI and e^SS = eSS . Therefore since from lemma 2, eMI > eSS
and from (14) we know that in a symmetric equilibrium for ea = eb = e it must be the case that
dh(e;e;)
de < 0: Thus e
MI > eSS ) hMI < hSS which contradicts our initial assumption. A similar
proof applies to the other cases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
It follows directly from lemma 1, 2 and 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The expected policy outcome in an equilibrium J =MI;PI; SS given by:
P Jm = Pr(s = A)E(P
J
mjs = A) + Pr(s = B)E(P Jmjs = B)
where E(P Jmjs = A) represents the expected median voter policy when the state is A and E(P Jmjs =
B) is the expected median voter policy when the state is B: That is:
E(P Jmjs = A) = J(majs = A)P Jm(ma) + J(mbjs = A)P Jm(mb)
Then by the symmetry of the equilibrium:
J(majs = A) + J(majs = B) = J(mbjs = B) + J(mbjs = A) = 1
Thus P Jm =
1
2
 
P Jm(ma) + P
J
m(mb)

= xm; 8J: The ex-ante policy distortion is given by:
Dist = Pr(s = A)
PFRm (s = A)  E(P Jmjs = A)+ Pr(s = B) PFRm (s = B)  E(P Jmjs = B)
where PFRm (s = A) = xm    and PFRm (s = B) = xm + . Now lets consider the expected policy
distortion in a semi-separating equilibrium. Then, since in a symmetric equilibrium hSSa = h
SS
b =
hSS :
SS(majs = A)  SS(majs = B) = SS(mbjs = B)  SS(mbjs = A) = (1  2qy)(2hSS   1)
moreover
PSSm (ma) = xm + 

1  2  hSS(1  2qy) + qy
PSSm (mb) = xm + 

1  2  (1  hSS)(1  2qy) + qy
Hence:
DistSS = 

1  (1  2qy)2(2hSS   1)2
DistMI = 

1  (2hMI   1)2
DistPI = 

1  (1  2y)2(2hPI   1)2
Thus:
@DistSS
@
> 0;
@DistSS
@q
> 0;
@DistSS
@y
> 0;
@DistSS
@hSS
< 0 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
In a fully revealing equilibrium the expected utility of voter i is Ui(xi) =   (xm   xi)2; the expected
utility of media outlet is Un('n) =   (xm   'n)2; the expected utility of lobby a is Wa(a) =
   x2m + 2 : In a semi-separating type of equilibrium:
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a) Expected utility of voter i is:
USSi (xi) =  (
1
2
  xi)2   42
 
qy + hSS(1  2qy)  1  qy + hSS(1  2qy)
Hence, the expected loss from voter i perspective is:(DUi)SS = 2 1  (1  2qy)2(2hSS   1)2
Thus from the proof of proposition 2:(DUi)SS = (DistSS)
Hence
(DUi)SS is positively related to ; y and q and negatively related with hSS : The same
reasoning applies to the media outlet.
b) The expected utility of lobby a in a semi-separating equilibrium is:
WSSa (a) =  (
1
4
+ 2) + 42
 
qy + hSS(1  2qy)  1  qy + hSS(1  2qy)  c(eSSa )
thus from lobbies perspective the expected benetnloss from this game with respect to a fully
revealing equilibrium is:
(DWj)
SS = 2

1  (1  2qy)2(2hSS   1)2  c(eSSj ); 8j = a; b
thus it is immediate to see that the expected gain of each lobby from engaging in inuence activities
is directly related with the expected loss of voters.
(DWa)
SS =
(DUi)SS  c(eSSa )
(DWb)
SS =
(DUi)SS  c(eSSb )
Thus the higher the expected loss of voters, the higher the expected gain on lobbies. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
Let the state of nature be A: In a fully revealing equilibrium, voter i receives perfectly informative
message, i.e., Pr(s = Ajma) = 1: Thus the preferred policy of voter i in such equilibrium will be
PFRi = xi   : Let P Jm be the median voter policy in an equilibrium J (where J = MI; SS; PI):
Then voter i prefers a fully revealing equilibrium if and only if:PFRm   PFRi  < P Jm   PFRi 
thus since for xi < xm; it is obviously always the case that voter i prefers the FR policy outcome
we have 2 cases to analyze:
1)P Jm < P
FR
i (that is xi > P
J
m +  = xi) which implies that the above condition becomes:
P Jm < xm   ; which is clearly impossible since P Jm 2 [xm   ; xm + ]
2) P Jm > P
FR
i (that is xi < P
J
m +  = xi); thus xi   xm < P Jm   xi +  )
xi <
1
2
 
P Jm +  + xm

= xB
Moreover notice that xB < xi: A similar reasoning applies when the state of nature be B:
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4
The result on the expected policy distortion follows immediately from the proof of proposition 2.
Moreover, it follows immediately from the proof of proposition 3 that:
UMIi (xi) < U
PI
i (xi) if and only if y <
hPI   hMI
2hPI   1
and
WPIa > W
MI
a if and only if y >
1
2
0@1 
q
2 (2hMI   1)2   [c(ePI)  c(eMI)]
 (2hPI   1)
1A
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
In aMI type of equilibrium eMI = 12

2
q

c   1

and 'l =
1
2 
p
c. An increase in  leads to a
lower 'l; thus for any 'l; the equilibrium would remain a MI one. Thus since
@eMI
@ > 0, the result
follows: Lets focus now on the SS type of equilibrium. Then eSS = 12


( 12 'l)
  1

; where
'l 2 (~'l; 'l) and q = 12y

1  2
p
c
( 1
2
 'l)

: Thus since @q@ < 0 and
@eSS
@ > 0; the result follows. Lets
focus now on the PI type of equilibrium. Then ePI = 12

2
q
(1 2y)2
c   1

and ~'l =
1
2  
p
c
(1 2y) :
Thus an increase in  leads to a lower ~'l: There are two possible cases. Either 'l is still lower than
the new ~'l; in which case the equilibrium is still a PI one and thus the net e¤ect of an increase in
 would be just an increase in lobbiese¤orts (since @e
PI
@ > 0). On the other hand, if 'l becomes
higher than ~'l; the equilibrium switches to a SS one. Nevertheless, from the above reasoning we
know that in a SS equilibrium @e
SS
@ > 0 and
@q
@ < 0: Thus in this second case we have that the
net e¤ect of an increase in  would be to increase lobbiese¤orts and to decrease the probability
of news-slantingby the media outlet. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
In a MI type of equilibrium eMI = 12

2
q

c   1

and 'l =
1
2  
p
c. An increase in c leads
to a lower 'l; thus for any 'l; the equilibrium remains a MI one. Thus since
@eMI
@c < 0 the result
follows. Lets focus now on a SS type of equilibrium. Then eSS = 12


( 12 'l)
  1

; where
'l 2 (~'l; 'l). Then obviously @e
SS
@c = 0: On the other hand, q =
1
2y

1  2
p
c
( 1
2
 'l)

thus @q@c < 0: Thus
the net e¤ect of an increase in c in a SS equilibrium is a lower probability of news-slantingby
the media outlet. Lets focus now on a PI type of equilibrium. Then ePI = 12

2
q
(1 2y)2
c   1

and ~'l =
1
2  
p
c
(1 2y) : Thus an increase in c leads to a lower ~'l: There are two possible cases. Either
'l is still lower than the new ~'l; in which case the equilibrium is still a PI one and thus the net
e¤ect of an increase in  would be just a decrease in lobbiese¤orts (since @e
PI
@c < 0). On the other
hand, if the 'l becomes higher than ~'l; the equilibrium switches to a SS one. Nevertheless, from
the above reasoning we know that in a SS equilibrium @e
SS
@c = 0 and
@q
@c < 0: Thus in this second
case we have that the net e¤ect of an increase in c is to decrease lobbiese¤orts (up to the bound
where ePI = eSS) and a decrease the probability of news-slantingby the media outlet. The same
reasoning applies to the comparative statics for y: Q.E.D.
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